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the employees.25  If the employee is required to pay for the
utilities without reimbursement from the employer, the utilities
are not excludable from income.26
Supporting resolution.  If it is intended for the require-
ments to be met for employees to exclude the fair rental value of
a corporate-owned residence from income, it is advisable for the
corporation's board of directors to adopt a resolution requiring
corporate employees to reside on the premises.27
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 7 Harl, Agricultural
Law § 57.03[2] (1990).
2 I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(D).
3 I.R.C. § 164(a)(1).
4 See I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1).
5 See I.R.C. § 280A(a).
6 I.R.C. § 280A(a),(c)(1).  See Proskauer
v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1983-395.
7 See Dean v. Comm'r, 187 F.2d 1019
(3d Cir. 1951) (value taxed as additional
compensation).
8 I.R.C. § 119.
9 Peacock v. Comm'r, 256 F.2d 160 (5th
Cir. 1958).
1 0 Crowe v. U.S., 84-1 U.S.Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 9327, 4 Cls. Ct. 734 (Ct.
Cl. 1984).
1 1 See I.R.C. § 119.
1 2 Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(b).
1 3 Id.
1 4 Ltr. Rul. 8826001, Oct. 14, 1987.
1 5 Greene v. Kanne, 38-1 U.S.Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 9206 (D. Hawaii 1938);
Renton v. Kanne, 38-1 U.S.Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 9207 (D. Hawaii 1938).
1 6 Roberts v. Comm'r, 17 P-H Tax. Ct.
Mem. 516 (1948).
1 7 Peterson v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo.
1966-196.
1 8 257 F. Supp. 16 (D. Wyo. 1966).
1 9 Id.
2 0 442 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1971).
2 1 Id.
2 2 T.C. Memo. 1985-174.
2 3 T.C. Memo. 1985-175.
2 4 Rev. Rul. 68-579, 1968-2 C.B. 61.
2 5 See Harrison v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo.
1981-211.  But see Vanicek v.
Comm'r, 85 T.C. 731 (1985), acq.,
1986-1 C.B. 1 (portion of cost of util-
ities for residence provided by em-
ployer not deductible because of lack
of evidence by which utility costs
could be apportioned between business
and personal use.)
2 6 Turner v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 48 (1977)
(cost of utilities and furnishings pur-
chased by welder for house in which
welder required to reside not deductible
because utilities and furnishings not
provided by employer).
2 7 For a copy of such a resolution, see 7
Harl, supra note 1, App. 51C.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
ANTITRUST
PRICE FIXING.  The plaintiffs
were sellers of feeder cattle who sold cattle
to the defendant meat packers.  As a guide
for setting prices to be paid to cattle
sellers, the defendants used a publication
called the Yellow Sheet which published
the previous day's prices.  The court relied
upon the law of the case established in a
similar suit by the plaintiffs against meat
retailers who also used the Yellow Sheet
to establish prices paid to the meat
packers.  In re Beef Industry Antitrust
Litigation, 542 F. Supp. 1122 (N.D. Tex.
1982), aff'd 710 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied 465 U.S. 1052 (1984).  Under
the first case, the court found that the use
of the Yellow Sheet was only one of
several factors used to establish meat
prices.  In the current case, the court held
that the plaintiffs produced insufficient
evidence of similar pricing by the
defendants.  The plaintiffs also alleged that
the defendants acquired monopoly (one
seller) power over boxed beef sales and
monopsony (one buyer) power in the fed
cattle procurement market.  However, the
plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants
misused their power as oligopsonists
(market of dominant buyers).  The court
held that the plaintiffs produced insuffi-
cient evidence of market control by the
defendants to support either theory and that
the evidence under one theory tended to
negate the evidence supporting the other
theory.  In re  Beef Industry
Antitrust Litigation, 907 F.2d
510 (5th Cir. 1990), aff'g 713 F .
Supp. 971 (N.D. Tex. 1989).
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
DISCHARGE.  A claim for state em-
ployment taxes owed by the debtor on
wages earned by employees more than 90
days before the filing of bankruptcy was
held dischargeable.  In re  Pierce, 1 1 5
B.R. 523 (Bankr. N.D. Tex .
1990) .
EXEMPTIONS.  The debtor was not
allowed to exempt the debtor's interest in
an IRA under the Connecticut exemption
for "profit sharing, pension, stock bonus,
annuity or similar plan."  Matter o f
Spandorf, 115 B.R. 415 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 1990).
The debtors were shareholders in a cor-
poration which held title to their resi-
dences.  The corporation was involuntarily
dissolved many years before the debtors
filed for bankruptcy and claimed their
interests in the residences as exempt.
Although the debtors did not take any
action to revest title to the residences in
themselves, the assets of the corporation
revested in the sole shareholder in the
corporation by law upon the dissolution;
therefore, the debtors owned interests in
the residences which were eligible for the
exemption.  In re  Morris, 115 B . R .
626 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1990).
PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS.
The debtors fed cattle belonging to another
person and sold the cattle after the cattle
reached a certain weight.  The proceeds of
the sales were then sent to the owner who
returned the amount to be paid for the
feeding.  The court held that the payment
of the sales proceeds within 90 days before
the bankruptcy filing were not preferential
transfers because the cattle and proceeds
never belonged to the debtors.  In re
Zwagerman, 115 B.R. 540 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1990).
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PROFESSIONAL FEES.  A farm
management company provided services to
the debtors and the debtors' attorney in
managing the debtors' farm and formulat-
ing the debtors' bankruptcy documents.
The company applied to the bankruptcy
court for employment as a professional
but the application was turned down for
lack of specificity.  A second application
was made but not ruled upon.  The com-
pany applied for professional fees after the
reorganization plan was submitted.  The
court held that no fees would be awarded
because the company failed to obtained
court approval for employment before
providing the services.  In addition, the
company was required to pay back to the
estate money received from the debtors in
partial payment for the services.  The
court noted the company's long experience
with providing services to bankruptcy
debtors and the adequate time for acquiring
approval for employment as factors for
denying the fees in this case.   In re
Grimes, 115 B.R. 639 (Bankr. D
S.D. 1990).
TURNOVER.  The debtor was a part-
ner in an accounting partnership and
owned an interest in a 401(k) plan admin-
istered by a plan committee and a trust.
After filing for bankruptcy, the debtor
declared the interest in the 401(k) plan as
exempt and requested payment of the funds
from the partnership.  The debtor received
the funds and used them to pay federal and
state taxes and living expenses plus some
personal debts incurred after bankruptcy.
The bankruptcy trustee filed a petition
against the partnership for turnover of the
funds in the 401(k) plan as estate property.
The partnership argued that it did not have
ownership or control over the funds.  The
court held that the committee and trust set
up to manage the plan under the
requirements of Section 401 were entities
separate from the partnership and held
possession and control over the plan
funds.  Thus, the partnership was not
liable for the payment of the funds to the
debtor and not required to turn over the
funds in the plan.  In re  Robertson,
115 B.R. 613 (Bankr. N.D. I l l .
1990) .
    CHAPTER 11
EXECUTORY CONTRACTS.  At the date
of filing bankruptcy, debtor was a party to a
land sales contract for the purchase of
undeveloped land.  After the filing of
bankruptcy, the debtor defaulted on the
contract and, within a month after the
bankruptcy filing, the seller petitioned for
acceptance or rejection of the contract.  The
court held that the debtor would be allowed
120 days after the bankruptcy filing to
assume or reject the contract.  The court
noted that the bankruptcy code does not
place a time limit on acceptance or rejection
of executory contracts in Chapter 11 but
reasoned that the debtor should have at least
the 120 days which are allowed for filing a
plan of reorganization.  In re Taber Farm
Assoc., 115 B.R. 455 (Bankr. S . D .
N.Y. 1990).
    CHAPTER 12
PLAN.  The debtor's Chapter 12 plan
determined the claim of the FmHA as secured
only as to the value of the collateral less the
costs of foreclosure, even though the debtor
was to retain possession of the collateral
under the plan.  The debtor argued that under
the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, the
FmHA would be required to restructure the
loan according to the fair market value less
foreclosure costs.  The court held that the
provisions of the 1987 Act do not apply to
the bankruptcy provisions regarding
valuation and under Section 506(a), the value
of the collateral is the fair market value,
based upon the purpose of the valuation and
the proposed use of the property.  Therefore,
because the debtor will retain and use the
property, the value of the property is not to
be decreased by any possible foreclosure
costs.  The plan also provided for a 6.5
percent interest rate on deferred payments,
again using an interest rate based upon the
debtor's rights under the 1987 Act.  The court
also rejected this provision and remanded the
case for a determination of a market rate of
interest.  In re  Case, 115 B.R. 6 6 6
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990).
    CHAPTER 13
PLAN.  The debtors' plan classified a
claimed secured by a third deed of trust
against the residence as unsecured because
the fair market value of the house was
exceeded by the amount owed on a debt
secured by the first mortgage.  The third
mortgage holder objected and argued that
Section 1322(b)(2) prevented modification
of claims secured by the debtors' residence.
The court held that Section 1322(b)(2)
applies after a determination of whether a
claim is secured or not under Section 506(a),
and therefore, the classification of the third
mortgage as unsecured is not prohibited by
Section 1322(b)(2).  In re  McNair, 1 1 5
B.R. 520 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    
ALLOCATION OF PAYMENT OF TAXES.
A corporate debtor made a payment for taxes
after filing for Chapter 11 and requested the
IRS to apply the payment to withholding
taxes.  The IRS treated the payment as
involuntary and applied the payment to
nonwithholding taxes due.  Within 12 days
after the payment, the debtor converted the
case to Chapter 7.  The court held that
because the payment was made improperly
after filing of the Chapter 11 petition and so
close to conversion to Chapter 7, the
payment was not voluntary.  The court
refused to use any equitable powers resulting
from the holding in In re Energy Resources
Co., Inc., 110 S.Ct. 2139 (1990) (see p. 127
supra), because the payments were made
improperly, would harm other unsecured
creditors, and were made only to decrease the
shareholders' liability as persons
responsible for payment of the withholding
taxes.  In re  Poleshuk, 115 B.R. 7 1 6
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990).
AUTOMATIC STAY.  After the debtors
had filed a petition in bankruptcy in 1981,
the IRS made Section 6672 assessments
against the debtors for unpaid withholding
taxes without first obtaining relief from the
automatic stay.  For the purposes of the
present case, the court assumed that the IRS
did not have actual notice of the bankruptcy
filing at the time of the assessment.  The IRS
also filed a claim in the bankruptcy
proceeding for the assessed taxes.  The
debtors were discharged in 1983 but did not
receive a discharge from the tax liability.
The IRS filed liens for the taxes and in 1987
levied against the debtors' bank account and
wages.  The court held that the IRS
assessment during the bankruptcy case was
void ab initio and because the IRS did not
make any valid assessment until more than
six years after the tax liability arose, the IRS
levies based on that assessment were illegal
and to be refunded to the debtors.  The court
noted that the IRS had more than 28 months
after the discharge of the debtors to make a
valid assessment but failed to do so.
Anglemeyer v. U.S., 115 B.R. 5 1 0
(D. Md. 1990).
The IRS levied against funds held by a
bankruptcy trustee which were payable to the
taxpayer as attorney's fees under Chapter 13
confirmed plans of unrelated debtors.  The
trustee argued that the levy violated the
automatic stay in the bankruptcy cases.  The
court held that the levy did not violate the
automatic stay because no harm would result
to the debtors, creditors or bankruptcy
estates from the levy because the property
levied against was payable to the taxpayer
under confirmed plans.  As the dissent noted,
the court did not provide any authority for
this holding and ignored the plain language
of Section 362(a)(3).  Laughlin v. U . S . ,
90-2 U.S.Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 5 0 , 4 5 9
(8th Cir. 1990).
AVOIDABLE LIENS.  The debtors sought
to avoid a tax lien which secured a
dischargeable tax claim against real
property.  The court held that because the
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debtors had no equity in the property the tax
lien was unsecured and avoidable under
Section 506(d).  In re  Frengel, 1 1 5




BORROWER'S RIGHTS.  The Small
Business Administration has adopted as final
regulations implementing the homestead
protection provisions of Pub. L. No. 100-
233, 101 Stat. 1676 (1988), for farm loans
made by the SBA.  55 Fed. Reg. 3 3 8 9 0
(Aug. 20, 1990).
COMMUNITY FACILITY LOANS.
The FmHA has adopted as final regulations
implementing the grant program for rural
community water systems established by the
Disaster Assistance Act of 1989.  55 Fed .
Reg. 32645 (Aug. 17, 1990).
COTTON.  The ASCS has issued
proposed amendments to the cotton ware-
house regulations which would allow
licensed cotton warehousemen to issue
negotiable warehouse receipts for reginned
motes and insert certain language relating to
liens in the schedule of warehouse charges or
tariff.  55 Fed. Reg. 340231 ( A u g .
21, 1990).
CROP INSURANCE.  The FCIC has
announced its intent to revise the Standard
Reinsurance Agreement for the 1992
reinsurance year, pending congressional
appropriation of funds for crop insurance.
55 Fed. Reg. 34723 (Aug. 2 4 ,
1 9 9 0 ) .
The FCIC has adopted as final
amendments to the apple crop insurance
regulations to provide that premium
reduction gained by insureds through good
insuring experience will be extended beyond
the 1990 crop year.  55 Fed. Reg. 35555
(Aug. 31, 1990).
MEAT AND POULTRY IN-
SPECTION.  The FSIS has adopted as final
amendments to the meat and poultry
inspection regulations to permit the use of
wheat gluten, tapioca dextrin, whey protein
concentrate, and sodium caseinate as binders
in various meat and poultry products.  5 5
Fed. Reg. 34679 (Aug. 24, 1990).
  PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS ACT.
The respondent was a meat packer subject to
the PSA and failed to pay $9,131.98 for beef
trimmings within ten days after the sale.  The
respondent argued that the penalty assessed,
the $5,000 minimum under 7 U.S.C. §
192(b), was too high given the financial
difficulties of the respondent, the amount of
money not paid and the low income of the
respondent.  The ALJ held that the statutory
minimum was proper because the respondent
knew the business was in trouble when the
purchase was made, the respondent had three
weeks to make the payment before the
company was placed under a receiver, and the
respondent's sole shareholder had sufficient
other income.  In re  Ampex Meat s
Corp, 47 Agric. Dec. 1123 (June
1 9 8 8 ) .
PEANUTS.  The AMS has adopted as
final amendments to the incoming and
outgoing peanut regulations governing the
terms and conditions for indemnification for
1990 crop peanuts.  55 Fed. Reg. 3 4 5 0 9
(Aug. 23, 1990).
The ASCS has affirmed the preliminary
determination of a national poundage quota
of 1,560,000 short tons for the 1990-91
marketing year.  55 Fed. Reg. 3 4 0 3 5
(Aug. 21, 1990).
The CCC has affirmed the preliminary
determinations of a national average price
support of $631.47 per short ton; a national
average support price of $149.75 per short
ton and a minimum sales price of $400.00
per short ton for additional peanuts for edible
use for export which were pledged as
collateral for a price support loan.  55 Fed .
Reg. 34036 (Aug. 21, 1990).
  PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL
COMMODITIES ACT.  The respondent
failed to make timely payments for several
shipments of lots of apples for which the
respondent acted as broker.  The failure to
pay was caused in part by a shortage of
apples and the resulting increase in prices
which substantially decreased the
respondent's business in a short time.  The
respondent suspended business when the
results of the shortage became evident,
contacted all unpaid suppliers and eventually
made full restitution.  Therefore, the ALJ
treated the case as a "slow pay" case and
imposed a 45 day suspension instead of a full
90 day suspension.  In re  C h i n o o k
Marketing Co., Inc., 47 Agric. Dec.
1146 (June 1988).
RURAL ELECTRIFICATION.  The
REA has adopted as final amendments to the
guaranteed loan regulations to establish
policies and procedures relating to the
prepayment of loans held by the Federal
Financing Bank and guaranteed by the REA.
55 Fed. Reg. 35425 (Aug. 3 0 ,
1 9 9 0 ) .
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
CLAIMS AGAINST ESTATE.  In
1958 and 1964 the decedent borrowed a total
of $1 million from a bank and pledged stock
as security.  The stock was also transferred in
trust to the decedent's children but the bank
retained possession of the stock.  In 1970,
1975 and 1985, the decedent's children
purchased the promissory notes of the
decedent from the bank using the stock as
security or as a source of funds to purchase
the notes.  The children then claimed the
promissory notes as claims against the
decedent's estate in 1986.  The IRS ruled that
because the decedent's loans were bona fide
arms-length transactions and the purchase of
the notes from the bank by the children were
bona fide arms-length transactions, the
claims against the estate were deductible.
Ltr. Rul. 9032003, April 30, 1990.
DISCLAIMERS.  The taxpayer was a
defeasible remainder beneficiary of a trust
providing life income interests for the
settlor's wife and children.  The taxpayer was
to receive any remaining trust corpus after
the last of the life beneficiaries had died.
When the last life beneficiary died, the
taxpayer disclaimed his interest in the
remainder of the trust.  The court held that the
disclaimer was subject to the time
limitations of Jewett v. Comm'r, 455 U.S.
305 (1982) even though the disclaimer was
made two years before Jewett because the
issue of retroactive application of Jewett was
not raised by the taxpayer or IRS.  Therefore,
the disclaimer was not made within a reason-
able time after the taxpayer became aware of
the existence of the taxpayer's defeasible
remainder interest in the trust.  Ordway v .
U.S., 90-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
60,035 (11th Cir. 1990), rev'g o n
p o i n t ,  89-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
13,802 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
A surviving spouse disclaimed after the
death of the decedent the interests of the
decedent in property they held as joint
tenants.  Although the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the disclaimer was
timely made, the case was remanded to
determine whether the disclaimer was
otherwise qualified.  The IRS argued that the
surviving spouse could not disclaim the
decedent's interest in the jointly held
property which the spouse originally owned
and had transferred to them as joint tenants.
The Tax Court held that the qualification of
the disclaimer was to be determined as of the
date of the decedent's death at which time the
decedent held a joint tenancy interest in the
property which passed to the surviving
spouse.  Therefore, the disclaimer was
qualified.  McDonald v. Comm'r, T . C .
Memo. 1989-140, on rem. from 8 5 3
F.2d 1494 (8th Cir. 1988), r ev 'g  8 9
T.C. 293 (1988).
GENERATION-SKIPPING
TRANSFER TAX.  An irrevocable trust for
five children of the settlor was established in
1973.  The five beneficiaries proposed to
split the trust into five trusts with each
beneficiary as a sole beneficiary of the
    Agricultural Law Digest                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    173
trusts.  The individual trusts retained the
same provisions and powers as the original
trust.  The IRS ruled that the resulting trusts
will be treated as having been created prior to
September 25, 1985 and not subject to the
GSTT.  Ltr. Rul. 9033016, May 1 8 ,
1 9 9 0 .
Two irrevocable trusts for nine children
of the settlor were established in 1968.  The
nine beneficiaries proposed to split the
trusts into nine separate trusts with each
beneficiary as a sole beneficiary of the
trusts.  The individual trusts retained the
same provisions and powers as the original
trust.  The IRS ruled that the resulting trusts
will be treated as having been created prior to
September 25, 1985 and were not subject to
the GSTT.  Ltr. Rul. 9033047, M a y
22, 1990.
INTEREST FREE LOANS.  From
1979 through 1984, the taxpayers made
interest free demand loans to several trusts.
After the decision in Dickman v. Comm'r,
465 U.S. 330 (1984), The taxpayers filed
amended Forms 709 and used the interest
rates set forth in Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2512-
5(c), 25.2512-9(c) as required by Rev. Rul.
73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408.  The IRS argued
that Rev. Proc. 85-46, 1985-2 C.B. 507
applied and assessed a deficiency.  The actual
yield on the money loaned to the trusts was
less than the rates assessed by the IRS.  The
court held that Rev. Proc. 85-46 was
reasonable and was to be applied to the
taxpayers' loans.  The court noted that Rev.
Rul. 73-61 held that only term loans were
complete and susceptible of valuation under
the regulations.  However, the court held that
the new rules of Rev. Proc. 85-46 superseded
any valuation rules in Rev. Rul. 73-61.  
Cohen v. Comm'r, 90-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,034 (7th C i r .
1990), aff'g 92 T.C. 1039 (1989).
LIFE INSURANCE.  The decedent
purchased a term life insurance policy on his
life, with the surviving spouse as owner and
beneficiary.  The decedent signed a
disclaimer which gifted the premium
payments from community property each
year.  The decedent died in 1980.  The court
held that under the version of Section 2035
in effect at the decedent's death, one-half of
the proceeds of the policy was includible in
the decedent's gross estate because the gift of
the premium for the last policy year was a
transfer "in respect to" a life insurance
policy.  Knisley v. U.S., 90-2 U . S .
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,037 (9th C i r .
1990), aff 'g  90-2 U.S. Tax C a s .
(CCH) ¶ 60,036 (E.D. Wash. 1988).
MARITAL DEDUCTION.  The
decedent bequeathed to a surviving child a
one-half interest in a condominium apart-
ment owned by the decedent and the
surviving spouse subject to the surviving
spouse's "right . . . to occupy it for her
lifetime conditioned on her paying the
expenses of maintaining it."  The IRS ruled
that under Missouri law, the bequest did not
convey a life estate to the surviving spouse
in the interest in the apartment with a power
to sell or lease the interest; therefore, the
interest was not eligible QTIP.  Ltr. R u l .
9033004, no date given.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION.  The
decedent had owned a farm for more than
eight years before death which was share
leased to an unrelated tenant.  The decedent
and the tenant equally shared expenses and
profits and the decedent was involved in
management decisions, including which
crops to plant.  The IRS held that the
decedent's interest in the farm qualified for
special use valuation because the decedent
materially participated in the operation of
the farm and the qualified heirs planned to
continue the lease arrangement with the same
participation.  Ltr. Rul. 9033030, M a y
21, 1990.
The decedent's estate tax return indicated
that the esate was making a special use
valuation election by marking the "yes" box
after the question "Do you elect special use
valuation?"  However, the return did not
contain a recapture agreement, Schedule N or
a notice of the election.  The court held that
the estate failed to substantially comply with
the requirements in the regulations and the
Form 706 instructions to make a valid
election.  The court also denied application
of Section 1421 of the Tax Reform Act of
1986 because the estate had not substantially
complied with the election requirements.




BAD DEBTS.  The taxpayer loaned
money to a daughter which was to be repaid
in installments after January 1, 1980 or six
months after the daughter left school.  The
loans did not provide for interest unless the
installments were not paid when due and the
whole loan was payable upon any default.
Some of the money was paid back but the
taxpayer made no attempts to collect unpaid
or late installments.  The IRS ruled that a true
debtor-creditor relationship was not
established and the debt was not eligible for
the bad debt deduction.  Ltr. R u l .
9033036, May 21, 1990.
CAPITAL GAIN.  The taxpayers sold
real property to a corporation formed by one
of the taxpayers to develop the land.  The
court held that the taxpayers recognized
capital gain from the sale because the value
of the promissory note received by the
taxpayers could be ascertained from the fair
market value of the property.  Est. o f
Hollo v. Comm'r, T.C. M e m o .
1 9 9 0 - 4 4 9 .
CASUALTY LOSSES.  The taxpayer
was not allowed a casualty or theft loss
deduction for the loss of a residence and
furnishings in an eviction resulting from a
legal foreclosure on a defaulted mortgage.
Washington v. Comm'r, T . C .
Memo. 1990-386 .
    C CORPORATIONS   
ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX.  The
IRS has issued the final regulations
implementing Section 56(f) on computing
the alternative minimum tax adjustment for
the book income of corporations, effective
for tax years beginning after December 31,
1986 and before January 1, 1990.  55 Fed .
Reg. 33671 (Aug. 17, 1 9 9 0 ) ,
adding Treas. Reg. §§ 1.56-0, 1.56-
1 .
HOBBY LOSSES.  The taxpayers were
not allowed to claim deductions in excess of
gross income from a horse farm activity
where the farm was not operated in a
business-like manner and the activity was
mostly for the personal pleasure of the
taxpayers.  Mills v. Comm'r, T . C .
Memo. 1990-432 .
   PARTNERSHIPS
JURISDICTION.  Under a final part-
nership administrative adjustment, the IRS
allocated all partnership guaranteed
payments to a general partner and several
months later assessed penalties for
substantial underpayment of taxes based
upon the allocation of guaranteed payments
in the FPAA.  The court held that it did not
have jurisdiction to hear the partner's appeal
of the penalties based upon the
misallocation of the guaranteed payments
because the guaranteed payments were
partnership items for which the time to file a
petition in appeal of the FPAA had expired.
Part of the guaranteed payments allocated
under the partnership agreement were to be
paid to other partners in exchange for
management assistance to the taxpayer.  The
court held that it had jurisdiction to hear the
taxpayer's appeal of the disallowance of
deductions for the amounts of the guaranteed
payments which were made to the other
partners under the partnership agreement.
Woody v. Comm'r, 95 T.C. No. 1 5
( 1 9 9 0 ) .
   S CORPORATIONS
BUILT-IN GAINS.  A wholly-owned
corporation with stock valued at less than $5
million made a S corporation election
effective December 1, 1987, and changed to a
calendar year effective January 1, 1988.  A
tax return as an S corporation was filed for
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December 1987 and calendar years 1988 and
1989.  The corporation now proposes to sell
appreciated assets.  The IRS ruled that the
corporation was a qualified corporation under
Section 633(d) and exempt from the built-in
gains tax under Section 1374.  Ltr. R u l .
9032035, May 16, 1990.
DEDUCTIONS.  The taxpayers were
shareholders of an S corporation which
transferred money to another corporation.
The shareholders claimed interest deductions
for the amounts based on characterization of
the transfers as loans on the corporations'
books.  The court disallowed the deductions
because no promissory notes were executed,
no maturity date was fixed and the only
payment was offset by an equal payment
from the other corporation.  Georgia C o l d
Storage Co. v. U.S. 90-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,450 (M.D. Ga .
1 9 9 0 ) .
INADVERTENT TERMINATION.  In part
satisfaction of indebtedness, a shareholder of
an S corporation transferred stock to three
trusts.  The trustee did not know that the
corporation was an S corporation and failed
to make elections required by Section
1361(d)(2) until notified by the
corporation's accountant who later discov-
ered the omissions.  The IRS ruled the
termination of S corporation status inad-
vertent and allowed the trusts to make the
required elections and the corporation to
maintain its S corporation status.  Ltr.
Rul. 9032025, May 15, 1990.
Although a beneficiary of a trust holding
S corporation stock signed a consent to the S
corporation election, the trust failed to file
the elections required by Section 1361(d)(2).
The IRS ruled the termination of S
corporation status inadvertent and allowed
the trust to make the required elections and
the corporation to maintain its S corporation
status.  Ltr. Rul. 9032026, May 1 5 ,
1 9 9 0 .
SECOND CLASS OF STOCK.  An S
corporation provided a deferred compen-
sation and long-term incentive plan for its
key employees which allowed the employees
to purchase performance units with funds
from their annual bonus.  The plan agreement
provided that the income tax liability of the
employee for the performance units would
not be as dividends from stock.  The IRS
ruled that the plan did not create a second
class of stock in violation of the
corporation's S corporation status.  Ltr.
Rul. 9032027, May 15, 1990.
SALE OF RESIDENCE.  The taxpayer
entered into a sale agreement to purchase
improved real estate which the taxpayer had
been renting from the seller and which the
taxpayer had been using as a principal
residence.  The taxpayer performed all
requirements of the sales agreement but the
seller did not make final settlement on the
agreement.  After the taxpayer filed suit for
specific performance under the agreement,
the parties reached a settlement in which the
taxpayer agreed to vacate the land and
remove all improvements in exchange for
payments from the sellers.  The taxpayer
used the settlement proceeds to purchase
another residence.  The court held that,
because under Virginia law the taxpayer was
the equitable owner of the land before the
settlement, the gain from the court
settlement was deferrable upon the purchase
of the second residence.  Poague v. U . S . ,
90-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 5 0 , 4 4 8
(E.D. Va. 1990).
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
SEPTEMBER 1990
  Semi-
    Annual                                                                                                                                           annual     Quarterly       Monthly   
Short-term
        AFR  8.08 7.92 7.84 7.79
110%AFR  8.90 8.71 8.62 8.56
120%AFR 9.73  9.50 9.39 9.32
Mid-term
        AFR  8.53  8.36 8.27 8.22
110%AFR 9.41 9.20 9.10 9.03
120%AFR 10.28 10.03 9.91 9.83
Long-term
        AFR  8.74 8.56 8.47 8.41
110%AFR 9.64 9.42 9.31 9.24
120%AFR 10.53  10.27 10.14 10.06
NUISANCE
APIARY.  The land owned by the
defendants was used as a vegetable farm when
the land and the land surrounding it were
zoned for residential use only.  Fourteen
years later, the defendants established an
apiary on the land.  The court held that the
establishment of an apiary was a change in
the nature of the farming use and was a
nonconforming use under the zoning
ordinance and therefore a nuisance per se.
The defendants argued that the Michigan
right-to-farm law, Mich. Stat. § 12.122(1) et
seq., exempted the farm from a nuisance
claim.  The court held that the right-to-farm
statute did not apply to the defendants' farm
because the apiary did not exist until after the
time of the change in the neighboring land
resulting from the zoning change.  Jerome
Township v. Melchi, 457 N .W.2d
52 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
CHICKEN FARM.  The defendant
started a chicken operation two years after
the plaintiffs moved on to neighboring land
and established a residence.  The plaintiffs
filed a nuisance action claiming loss of value
to their property from the odors from a pit
used to dispose of dead chickens and the
spreading of chicken waste on the
defendant's fields.  The court held that the
trial court should have submitted to the jury
the issue of damage to the value of the
plaintiffs' land to the extent of the loss of
fair market value resulting from the
defendant's chicken operation.  In addition,
the court held that the trial court improperly
applied the right-to-farm statute, Ala. Code §
6-5-127(a), because the chicken operation
was begun after the plaintiffs established
their residence.  Swedenberg v .
Phillips, 562 So.2d 170 ( A l a .
1 9 9 0 ) .
PARTNERSHIPS
PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY.  The
parties to this action were partners in a farm
partnership.  The partnership farmed land to
which title was held in the name of one of the
partners and his spouse.  The court held that
the farm was partnership property because
the land was acquired for the partnership, the
acquiring partner was reimbursed for the
purchase price from partnership income, and
the partners intended the land to be
partnership property.  The plaintiff was
expelled from the partnership, causing its
dissolution in 1981, but the defendant
continued the partnership business until the
partnership terminated as a business in
1988.  The court held that the plaintiff was
entitled to the value of his partnership
interest as of the date of dissolution and not
one-half of the land upon termination.  The
value of the land had decreased after the
dissolution but the court held that under Tex.
Civ. Stat. art. 6132b, § 42, the continuing
partner was at risk for any post-dissolution
loss and the expelled partner was entitled to
the value of the partnership interest at the
date of dissolution.  The court also held that
the plaintiff was entitled to post-dissolution
interest on the value of the partnership
interest up to the date of judgment in the
case.  King v. Evans, 791 S . W . 2 d
531 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
SECURED
TRANSACTIONS
CONSIGNMENTS.  The debtors had
operated a feedlot for cattle they owned for
several years before agreeing to feed cattle
owned by another person.  The other person
shipped cattle to the debtors' feedlot and the
debtors sold the cattle after the cattle reached
a certain weight.  The proceeds of the sales
were to be sent to the other person who
would then tender to the debtor the amount
owed for the feeding.  The debtors did not
keep records of the sales of each animal but
treated the sales on the FIFO method of
accounting.  The cattle were commingled
with the debtors' own cattle and not
separately identified.  In obtaining a loan,
the debtor granted the creditor a security
interest on the debtors' cattle. on the date of
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bankruptcy filing, the debtor had insufficient
cattle to meet the number of cattle which
belonged to the other person.  The creditor
and the other person claimed a priority
interest in the cattle.  Under U.C.C. § 2-236,
goods delivered on approval are not subject
to the security interests of creditors of the
buyer but goods delivered for sale or return,
including consignments or other
reservations of title, are subject to the
security interests of the creditors of the
buyer.  The court held that section 2-236 did
not apply to the cattle feeding contract
because the cattle were not delivered on
approval or for resale but for feeding.  The
sales were made by the original owner but
with the debtors as agents to transact the
sales.  The court also held that cattle pur-
chased by the debtors with the proceeds of
the sales of the other person's cattle
belonged to the other person under a con-
structive trust.   In re  Zwagerman, 1 1 5
B.R. 540 (Bankr. W.D. M i c h .
1 9 9 0 ) .
CONVERSION.  The debtor granted the
plaintiff a security interest in crops and
proceeds.  The debtor sold the crop to the
defendant who paid half of the proceeds to
the debtor and applied the other half to
amounts owed by the debtor to the defendant.
The plaintiff then sued the defendant for
conversion based upon the security interest
in the crops.  The debtor filed Chapter 12
bankruptcy and the debtor and plaintiff
reached a settlement of all claims by the
plaintiff against the debtor.  The settlement,
however, reserved the plaintiff's rights to
pursue the defendant for conversion.  The
court held that the settlement of all claims by
the plaintiff against the debtor released the
defendant from any claim for conversion of
the collateral securing those claims.
Farmers State Bank v. Easton Elev.,
457 N.W.2d 763 (Minn. Ct. A p p .
1 9 9 0 ) .
PRIORITY.  A creditor's perfected
security interests in the debtor's accounts
receivable which arose within 46 days after a
federal tax lien was filed against the debtor's
accounts receivable held priority over the
federal tax liens.  In re  May Repor t ing
Services, Inc., 115 B.R. 6 5 2
(Bankr. D. S.D. 1990).
The plaintiffs loaned money to the
debtors and perfected a security interest in
livestock purchased by the debtors with the
money.  The debtors later borrowed money
from the defendant who perfected a security
interest in all livestock owned by the
debtors, including after-acquired livestock.
On the defendant's security agreement, the
defendant had noted that the security interest
was junior to the plaintiffs' security interest
in the debtor's livestock.  However, the
plaintiffs' security interest lapsed and
became junior to the defendant's security
interest when the plaintiffs failed to file a
timely continuation statement.  The
plaintiffs argued that their security interest
retained priority because the notation on the
defendant's security agreement was either a
subordination agreement or a waiver.  The
court held that the notation was not a
subordination agreement or a waiver of
priority because the defendant's security
interest was already junior to the plaintiffs'
at the time the notation was made; therefore,
the defendant had nothing to subordinate or
waive.  The court also rejected the plaintiffs'
equitable estoppel argument because none of
the elements of that claim was shown.
Folkers v. Britt, 457 N.W.2d 5 7 8
(Iowa 1990).
PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY
INTEREST.  The debtor purchased 100
cows from his parents.  The cows were part
of the parents' herd the debtor had moved to
his farm because his father could no longer
take care of them.  The purchase agreement
was signed on April 6 and granted the parents
a purchase money security interest in the
cows as security for four annual payments for
the cows.  The security interest was not filed
until April 30.  Under the purchase
agreement, the debtor could choose 100 cows
from the existing herd and any new calves.
The selection process was completed by
June.  The debtor had also granted a security
interest in all livestock to a creditor which
was perfected as of the date the purchase
agreement was signed.  The court held that
the purchase money security interest was not
entitled to super priority over the creditor's
perfected security interest in the cows
because the purchase money security interest
was not filed within 10 days after the debtor
gained possession of the cows as required
under Idaho Code § 28-9-312(4).  The court
rejected the parents' argument that posses-
sion was not complete until the 100 cows
had been selected in June.  Valley B a n k
v. Est. of Rainsdon, 793 P.2d 1 2 5 7
(Idaho Ct. App. 1990).
REPLEVIN.  After default of the
plaintiff on several loans secured by the
plaintiff's farm machinery and livestock, the
defendant brought an action in replevin to
recover possession of the collateral and was
granted possession of the collateral which
was eventually sold.  The plaintiff alleged
that the replevin action was improper
because the collateral was taken prior to final
judgment on the loans, the sheriff failed to
file a report required by statute and the
defendant sold the collateral before final
judgment on the loans.  The court held that
the prejudgment taking of the collateral was
proper in that the defendant proved a
perfected security interest in the collateral,
the default of the plaintiff and the value of
the collateral.  The court also held that the
misconduct of the sheriff did not invalidate
the replevin but was only a punishable
offense.  The court held that the prejudgment
sale of the collateral was not improper but
only made the defendant liable for the
proceeds if the judgment on the loans was
equal to or greater than the proceeds.  In
addition, the court reversed a summary
judgment against the plaintiff on the issue of
the commercial reasonableness of the sale of
the collateral, holding that issues of material
fact remained.  Mushitz v. First B a n k
of South Dakota, 457 N.W.2d 8 4 9
(S.D. 1990).
STATE TAXATION
GRAIN ELEVATOR.  A grain
elevator was assessed state personal property
tax on grain stored in the elevator but owned
by others.  The elevator did not file a Form
103-N containing the names of the persons
owning the grain stored in the elevator until
after an audit.  The tax assessed was then
decreased by the amount of taxes paid by
owners of the grain located in the county
where the elevator was located.  The records
of other counties were not searched.  The
elevator argued that it should not have been
assessed for the grain owned by others
outside of the county because it filed the
Form 103-N.  The court held that because the
elevator did not file a timely Form 103-N,
the elevator could be assessed for grain
owned by persons outside of the county
except to the extent the elevator provides
evidence that taxes were paid on the grain by
those owners.  Board of Tax Comm'rs
v. Jewell Grain Co., 556 N .E .2d
920 (Ind. 1990), rev 'g  524 N .E .2d
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